Summary
1. SLT welcomes the proposal to establish a directly elected authority for London, to consist of a Mayor and Assembly, together called the Greater London Authority (the "GLA"), and to be the policy making body controlling various pan-London agencies.
2. The wider purpose of a new system of government for the whole of London must be for London to become a more sustainable city, environmentally, economically and socially. This should be written into the legislation establishing the new authority, making London the first world city to place sustainability at the core of city government.
3. Becoming a sustainable city will be an on-going city-wide learning exercise in which all organisations and people in London participate. In addition to its responsibility for the agencies under its control, the GLA should be the body that leads London on its journey towards sustainability and is responsible for making sure the necessary decision- making processes take place (the "leadership role").
4. The legislation establishing the GLA should lay down criteria for the way in which the leadership role is carried out. The GLA should be obliged to:
(1) provide coherence and integration in the planning of different services and activities so they support each other in achieving social, environmental and economic goals:
(2) have a consensus-seeking, open and accountable political process and culture
(3) involve the wider community, especially young people and people suffering from economic or social exclusion, as a routine and integral part of the processes, not an occasional bolt-on.
5. It should be the responsibility of the Mayor to enable these processes to happen and to comply with these criteria. It should be the responsibility of the Assembly to ensure that he or she does so. The Mayor will undertake the leadership role. The Assembly will have power to approve or disapprove the mayor's budget and will scrutinise the Mayor's actions.
6. A London Citizens Forum (this is at present a provisional name only) is being formed to provide a channel through which Londoners can contribute on their own terms. It will provide a home for activist approaches to making London a more socially friendly and environmentally responsible city.
This Response takes the form of 15 pages of introduction (in response to the Introduction and first chapter of the Green Paper), followed by answers to the specific questions raised in the remaining chapters.
Introduction and Chapter 1
1. We welcome many features of the Green Paper. Much of it coincides with our own thinking as set out in our Discussion Paper London Government: Learning Sustainability dated 16 July 1997 (a copy accompanies this Response).
At this point we warmly welcome
The Green Paper sets the scene in para 1.2-8. Whilst this is not the place to write at length about this, there are some broad features of the situation which need to be identified and borne in mind. We would pinpoint three points which we suggest are fundamental:
The purpose of a new system of government for the whole of London is for London to become a more sustainable city, environmentally, economically and socially.
Whilst we welcome the references in the Green Paper to sustainable development and the recognition that all the functions of the new authority come under this heading (para 4.02), someone reading the Green Paper does not reach these references until some way into the document. The object of restoring democratic city-wide government to London is expressed in the opening paragraph of the Foreword as "to preserve and enhance London's competitiveness, to tackle London's problems and to speak up for Londoners and their interests", wording which conveys little sense of the nature of the challenge. Sustainability is mentioned as the eighth and last point under the heading "The need for a strategic Authority" in para 1.08 and is treated as limited to environmental issues. It should be point 1, not point 8.
Sustainability came originally from an environmental agenda and the environmental issues have indeed become increasingly serious. But since the Earth Summit at Rio in 1992 when Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration adopted "sustainable development" as the key for the future, it has become widely appreciated that the concept is closely bound up with social and economic issues. It also involves a democratic principle. It is concerned with rights and responsibilities.
Sustainability is a solution-based approach, pragmatic, undogmatic, holistic. It has important implications for process as well as goals. It recognises the need for local distinctiveness in the way sustainable development is achieved. It is empowering as well as constraining.
It is not simply about long-term survival, coming after such apparently more pressing issues as maintaining London's competitive position and addressing the needs of Londoners as the Green Paper implies (e.g. at para 4.46). Addressing current needs and competitiveness need to be seen within the concept of sustainability.
The concept is now fundamental to decision-making at all levels of government and indeed to the decisions of corporations and individuals. Habitat II recognised its application to cities. Cities, in a world in which half the population now reside in cities, have special responsibilities. London, as one of the world's greatest cities, has a very special responsibility, a responsibility which however is inseparable from its own long-term interests, because London's own physical, economic and social health depends on the health of the world with which it interacts.
It is in this broad sense that we use the word sustainable throughout this paper.
What this means in practical terms is a complex question which it would be inappropriate even to sketch here. For such a sketch we respectively refer to our own publication "Creating a sustainable London" a copy of which accompanies this Response. Reference may also be made to the outputs of the Association of London Government's Agenda 21 process and the current London Study.
We also refer to paragraphs 2.1,2,&3 of our Discussion Paper which illustrates how the strands of improving the quality of life and living within environmental limits, far from being opposed, each hold the key to the achievement of the other.
The restoration of a directly elected strategic government for London presents a unique opportunity to place the concept of sustainability at the core of London-wide strategic thinking. The other objects mentioned in the Green Paper - appropriate democratic institutions and wider participation in decision-making, economic issues, the elimination of poverty, equal opportunities and so forth - should all be seen, as they now are in national and international terms, as part of the wider agenda for London becoming a more sustainable city. This is the only way to reach a balance between otherwise potentially conflicting considerations.
We therefore join in strongly urging the Government not to let this historic opportunity slip. Sustainability, in the wide sense in which it has now become established, is what London needs most of all and it should be written into the centre of the new authority's constitution. London will thus be the first city in the world to have such a constitution. Based on it, Londoners will be able to develop ways for a city to become both a world class city and an increasingly sustainable city. We believe this to be essential to its role as the capital city of the United Kingdom and the true test of our right to call it a great world city.
This opportunity has come to London by chance, certainly not as an intended consequence of the abolition of the GLC 12 years ago! We have done some research to see if any other city has found itself in a similar position. Apparently not. It is London's great fortune to be in a position to reinvent city governance in the light of the most up-to date thinking about how cities need to be managed in the 21st century. Now it is up to the Government to seize this extraordinary opportunity.
What all the work on sustainability has shown is that, whilst particular substantive issues and tensions are reasonably clear, the scene as a whole is extremely complex. This of course is obvious, but it is easy to leave the obvious unstated and then overlook it. We therefore make our second point:
The most significant characteristic of London's predicament is its complexity.
This paper is not the place to describe in any detail the complexity of the world in which London finds itself. But it is worth just mentioning some of the features of this complexity which have an important bearing on the argument which follows:
(a) the complexity includes many interacting issues:
(d) there are some deep inherent tensions between various economic, social and environmental goals and restraints, tensions for example between market driven forces and long-term environmental constraints and local social goals; also tensions between different regions of London and between individual boroughs;
(e) not all stakeholders have equal clout, no matter what the merit of their case;
(f) the relevant legislative provisions and the arrangements for public finance are complex
(g) everything keeps changing.
The essential point is that the system for London to become a more sustainable city must be able to deal with complexity. The system must be so designed as to be capable of analysing issues affecting different people in different ways and involving many separate departments and agencies. It must be capable of recognising and resolving different kinds of conflict in a constructive and coherent way. It must be able to cope with change and also, where necessary, to think and act fast in a fast changing world.
Thirdly, it must be borne in mind that becoming a sustainable city is a city- wide learning exercise which will continue for many years.
This is obvious. For example there is a great deal of work to be done to the physical infrastructure, and cultural changes are needed which will take years to bring about.
3. What needs to happen for London to meet the challenge of learning to become a sustainable city in a complex world? We warmly welcome the recognition implicit in the Green Paper that London needs to learn to think strategically and to act accordingly. We agree that the return of direct democracy to London presents an ideal occasion to establish structures which will enable the necessary systems to develop.
The point we would like to emphasise here - and it is indeed implicit in the Green Paper - is that it is London as a whole that needs to become sustainable, and therefore London as a whole that needs to learn to think strategically and to act accordingly. The London-wide strategic thinking that needs to be undertaken is thinking by London as a whole. The question for the White Paper, to be prepared in the light of the responses to the Green Paper, is not how can the new authority best think strategically, but how London as whole can learn to think strategically.
The challenge for the White Paper is to put in place structures which will enable London to think strategically and act accordingly.
If only the mayor and the few dozen assembly members were to engage in thinking strategically about how London can become more sustainable, little would be achieved. London is far too large, far too complex, its active parts far too independent, for a few councillors and officers to be able to control, even if they had the power to do so. The whole city, from the financiers and the construction industry to the teachers and shoppers, must learn how they can all contribute to London becoming a more sustainable city.
The management and direction of a city is far broader than the work of government institutions. The White Paper should be concerned not with the government of London but with the role of the GLA in the governance of London.
4. That distinction is crucial to some of the specific questions raised in the Green Paper. It might have been assumed that what London needs is a strategic authority to do its strategic thinking for it. That would have been a fundamental mistake, for both practical and political reasons. The model of democracy which consigns 99.99% of the population to the role of voter and consultee would not work and is today unacceptable.
The model which London should develop, as the Green Paper recognises, is one which allows and indeed seeks far wider involvement and participation in the processes of governance. Four reasons why such a model is essential for moves towards sustainability are set out in papa 2.4 of our Discussion Paper.
This is why we have welcomed the Green Paper's wish "to create a new model of government appropriate to a great capital city in the New Millennium" (para1.09). The prominence given to the word "inclusive" in the list of criteria at para 1.12, the proposal for the new authority to be a lean one and the commitment to increasing the involvement of local authorities, the voluntary sector, business and other public sector bodies (para 2.04) are welcome evidence of the Government's determination to move forward on this path.
5. We thus come to consider what sort of thinking/planning is needed and what sort of processes would enable London as a whole to think/plan strategically and act accordingly. The quality of the process will determine London's success in learning to become a more sustainable city.
That will provide the base from which to consider what structures are needed to enable such processes to happen.
In our Discussion Paper we summarised the principles of strategic thinking as needing to
(1) Provide coherence and integration in the planning of different services and
activities so that they support each other in achieving social, environmental and
economic goals:
(2) have a consensus-seeking, open and accountable political process and culture
(3) Involve the wider community as a routine and integral part of the processes, not
an occasional bolt-on.
The key requirements of strategic planning processes are described in paras 3.6 and 3.7 of the Discussion Paper and may be rephrased as follows:
The processes should have these features:
As to the participation of all concerned, the concept of sustainability points to particular constituencies that need to be involved:
As to the need for strategies to be reviewed and the requirement of openness,
- a round table to consider the nature and causes of inequalities in London and to come
up
with policies and action plans to reduce such inequalities
- a round table to identify the constituents and extent of London's global footprint and
come up with policies and action plans
- a round table to identify the technologies which London can make use of to become a
more
sustainable city, to identify blockages and to find ways round them
- a round table to examine the impact in London of the systems for distribution of public
money, such as single regeneration bids, and to consider whether they are effective to
meet London's needs and if not to make recommendations.
The GLA could institute such round-tables and provide for them to be serviced. They could then operate to some extent independently so that they have the maximum freedom to draw on all London's human resources. Some could be of limited duration, some permanent.
Such enquiries will of course overlap with work being done at national level, by government or government agencies, or at other levels, for example by individual boroughs. No harm. These are London problems and there may be many opportunities for addressing them at the London level. There are people in London, organisations in London, with radical and positive ideas on these subjects. These people may be in commerce or banking, they may be in government, they may be in local politics or in the universities. And there are millions of people who could contribute to action plans to address these sorts of problem, given a lead.
The GLA can provide that lead and the necessary fora for these ideas to be given an airing specifically in relation to London. However the possible use of round-tables is merely an illustration of the sort of machinery the GLA could use to draw in the expertise, innovative thinking and practical know-how of Londoners. Nor is the list at para 3.8 of the Discussion Paper exhaustive. New "tools" are becoming available each year. Numerous possibilities are offered by developments in information technology. (The GLA should have staff section keeping abreast of, and indeed leading, developments in this area.).
Just as the type of process must be chosen to suit the subject-matter, so must the participants. For example some problems need to be examined on a mainly sub-regional basis.
The GLA should make whatever provision it may consider appropriate to ensure that no organisation appearing to be capable of making a positive contribution to any process is prevented from doing so by lack of funds.
This is an obvious practical implication of inclusivity. It is a serious point in terms of re- awakening active citizenship in people currently excluded by poverty. It also has consequences in terms of enabling appropriate processes to take place.
The choice of process should be left to the GLA, working in cooperation so far as possible with the necessary participants.
Any attempt to detail specific processes in the White Paper or the legislation establishing the GLA would defeat the need to develop a "learning city" and to use processes which have the support of those participating. Different administrations will have different priorities, different styles. The changing situation will undoubtedly call for changes in the machinery best suited to meet it.
What the legislation must do is to set out, either in the body of the Act of Parliament or in Guidance to be issued pursuant to it, the key criteria to be complied with by the GLA in developing strategies; and these should reflect the requirements emphasised in bold in this paragraph 5.
It is appreciated that this course invites three kinds of objection:
(1) One is that the GLA could easily disregard these requirements (this is the fear behind the LVSC's proposal for a Civic Forum mentioned below). References have been made to the possibility of an over officious or even corrupt mayor. We understand these fears but consider that they are exaggerated. The GLA's powers acting on its own will be limited; to be effective, it will be well-advised to operate in the way we have suggested. We describe below the scrutiny powers of the Assembly over the Mayor if that form is adopted.. Moreover the public will have legally enforceable powers of access to information. The media is an effective watchdog over at least some forms of corruption. Finally, the GLA as an elected body will be subject to the threat of being voted out of power.
(2) A second kind of objection is that the processes could be challenged in the courts, for example by an objecting borough council, rather as some councils have themselves been taken to court for breach of consultation procedures, leading to delay in implementation of sensible and widely supported plans. This would be a real danger if every strategy could be challenged by judicial review of the process by which it was reached. Rights of recourse to the courts should be limited to access to information and breaches of duty in relation to the GLA's responsibilities for the bodies over which it has direct or indirect control. (See below as to the responsibilities of the Assembly if the assembly/mayor model is adopted).
(3) The third kind of objection is similar, namely that the procedures envisaged could be
very lengthy. This again is a reasonable fear and one that needs to be met by ensuring that
the procedures adopted need not involve lengthy delays. The GLA must be able to act
expeditiously; that is part of its ability to satisfy the criterion of being "effective". With
modern technology, free from the cumbersome procedures of local authority decision-
making, with a maximum of "bottom up" input into processes through the use of the new
"toolkit" of processes for wide participation in decision-making, with cooperation from
London's rich array of organisations keen to make a positive input, channelled where
appropriate through a London Citizens Forum (see below) we have no doubt that the
GLA will be able to provide effective leadership.
We do not consider that any of these kinds of objection justify taking short cuts.
6. If that is the sort of strategic thinking required and those are the kinds of processes needed or London to do this, what structures need to be put in place to enable such processes to happen?
We warmly welcome the Government's conclusion implicit in the Green Paper that old- style local authority institutions are not the answer. The public has very largely lost confidence in these at borough level and for several good reasons. Besides, the job at the London- wide strategic level is a very different one.
The function of the GLA (apart from its responsibilities for the agencies which it controls) should be to lead London on its journey towards sustainability and to be responsible for making the necessary decision-making processes take place (the "leadership role").
To become a more sustainable city, the whole of London must engage in a learning process. The GLA will lead that process, will coordinate it, and will ensure that it happens. We are glad to note that this is accords with the Green Paper's key criteria for the GLA including being "effective" and "influential".
7. A clear distinction needs to be drawn between
(a) the Authority's role in relation to services or matters over which it will have direct
or
indirect control via the various executive bodies for which it is responsible and
(b) the leadership role.
These are two very different kinds of role.
In its leadership role, the GLA's remit must extend beyond the services or matters over which it will have direct or indirect control to all issues which are relevant to London becoming a more sustainable city.
The leadership role is a role which does not take away from any of the responsibilities or independent control of the various participants in making London a more sustainable city. The leadership role can thus extend to, for example, education, housing, employment, energy, health, whatever the GLA's own responsibilities, if any, may be for these areas. That is what is meant by strategic thinking needing to be integrated. Indeed if the strategic thinking processes leave areas such as these out of account, the conclusions will be fatally flawed, the actions based on those conclusions misdirected and public money misspent - this is what integrated planning is all about.
We think it important to note explicitly that the GLA's functions will fall into two categories:
(a) its functions in relation to services or matters over which it will have direct or
indirect control via the various executive bodies for which it is responsible and
(b) the leadership role.
Those two functions will together comprise the functions of the Authority.
8. In its leadership role the GLA should provide THE forum and be THE focus for all London-wide strategies.
Certainly, the new authority should build on existing decision-making structures and processes where these have been found to work (para 1.09 of the Green Paper). But it should be clear that the GLA will now be the government body, for example, to lead the development of an Agenda 21 for London, building on the work led by the ALG and that of the borough LA 21 groups.
This does not conflict with the Government's determination that the GLA should be a lean authority. We agree with the word "small" being included in the list of key criteria provided that this is not taken as an excuse for starving the GLA of the resources it needs to play its leadership role (in the sense defined above) effectively. Indeed the role we have spelt out, of leading and making happen strategic thinking/planning processes, is the key to justifying the assertion that the new authority can do its job without becoming a massive institution. Much of the input into the strategy making will come from outside, from the various participants in the processes.
9. This point needs little illustration. It is well known that London's private sector has much to offer London, in terms of planning skills as well and business activity, as has been shown by some of the work contributed by London First and the London Pride Partnership. There is also a wealth of initiative and capacity for action in the "third sector" voluntary organisations, community groups, non-governmental organisations, the universities and individual "moving spirits". This has hitherto been largely untapped at the London-wide level as well as being under-used at the local level. The GLA can facilitate a growing contribution from these resources.
Take for example, very much at random,
In relation to these "bottom up" initiatives coming from the third sector, the GLA needs to be supportive but not interfering. It should adopt a strictly "hands-off" approach itself. It should be a champion for building a London-wide "can-do" culture. This is something which the boroughs, due to the inherent faults of the system, have failed to do. A GLA prepared to listen and learn from people and organisations in the third sector could have a productive influence. Yes, London is a city with its own strong sense of identity (para 1.03 of the Green Paper) - which the boroughs cannot have. An important element in London's identity is diversity and initiative: but there is also a very widespread lack of individual confidence in being able to achieve anything useful, an almost universal breakdown of trust. The GLA by championing initiative and diversity can lead the way in reviving confidence and trust.
Many of the same considerations apply to initiatives from the private sector. The private sector will make an important contribution to all kinds of problem solving. It is important however that the influence of the private sector should be filtered through systems which ensure that all considerations implicit in sustainability are taken into account as well as competitiveness, profitability and jobs.
The approach illustrated here will enable the GLA to be both "small" and also "effective", "audible" ," clear about its role" and "influential", five of the Green Paper's key criteria..
10. There should be procedures to encourage continuity between successive Mayors. London-wide strategies for topics such as land use, transport, economic development, social exclusion and education need to be built up and implemented over a long term. Each mayor would of course be elected on a strong personal vision for London - this after all is one of the main reasons to have a Mayor - but the Mayor should normally evolve and develop these strategies, rather than throwing them away and starting from scratch.
11. The GLA should also be the forum for planning the development
of major strategic sites.
Fully involving central government and the boroughs concerned, and using appropriate
decision-making processes to involve all other stakeholders, the GLA should take the lead
on
creating pro-active strategies for the development of major sites in London, for example
rail
terminals, air-ports, and very large redevelopments. These strategies will form part of the
main strategic plan.
12. We have argued
Participation implies both a willingness and also an ability to participate on the part of potential participants. In the case of many non-governmental organisations and millions of individuals, these conditions are at present largely lacking. It also implies a commitment to participation on the part of the authority, and there is a danger that this will be dominated by people stuck in the mind-set of party politics and reluctant even to consult the public, let alone involve them in the positive way indicated above.
For the London-system to operate in the way we have suggested, three things need to be developed:
(1) a culture of active citizenship
(2) organisational frameworks to enable the fullest participation of all
non-governmental sectors in the processes of strategic decision-making,
especially by those at present most excluded from civic activity
(3) Provisions to ensure that full participation does indeed take place.
As to (1),
a culture of active democracy needs to be developed throughout
London at the all levels.
The Green Paper refers in Para 1.03 to "community level government" in London.
The context suggests that the phrase was meant to refer to borough level democracy,
but
this is not the community level. The community level in fact relates to much smaller
areas.
This is the level at which large numbers of Londoners could most easily take an active part
in civil society. It is therefore important for the growth and health of democracy in
London as a whole that more inclusive forms of democracy should be developed at this
level. Too few opportunities exist at present.
We therefore believe that it would be useful for the development of citizenship and democracy in London generally if the GLA had an express function of promoting the development of participatory democracy in London not only at its own strategic level but at every level.
The means of carrying out this duty would be a matter for the discretion of the GLA. It could perhaps, produce a yearly London-wide democratic audit and invite each borough to do likewise. These audits would cover a wide range of activities, including work in schools and on estates. An annual debate following publication of these reports could be an effective instrument for change. This is however no more than an illustration of one means of carrying out the general duty. There is much scope for innovative use of information technology.
As to (2)
London needs to build on the arrangements already in place,
developing them where necessary to meet the new conditions. There is
also a need to construct new arrangements to meet the needs of those not
adequately served by existing arrangements.
London has many forums and umbrella bodies representing various sectors. In the absence of a London government since the abolition of the GLC, various partnerships have also come into existence, in particular the London Pride Partnership and various regional partnerships, which have enabled organisations such as London First and London Voluntary Service Council to play a part in London governance both on a regional and London-wide basis. These forums, umbrella bodies and partnerships, each of which have their own agendas and ways of operating, will be useful channels through which their members can take part in processes led by the GLA. They can all be developed in whatever ways may enable them to make a more effective contribution to these processes; but it should be left to the members of all existing bodies to make their own arrangements to enable them to make more effective contributions to the governance of London.
To meet the needs of those not adequately served by existing arrangements, local community groups, non-governmental organisations of any kind not otherwise adequately represented and individuals able and willing to make a contribution, a Citizens Forum should be created to ensure that every Londoner has a route to participate in all London-wide strategic decision-making and to coordinate such participation. The formation of such a forum is at present under discussion with numerous potential participants.
The concept of a London Citizens Forum (this is at present a provisional name only) is that of a channel through which Londoners can contribute on their own terms to the city-wide learning processes to which we have referred. It will provide a home for activist approaches to making London a more socially friendly and environmentally responsible city.
The London Citizens Forum could help in several ways:
A data-base of sources of information is already being constituted. It is envisaged that it will make extensive use of information technology: it will need to ensure that its systems are accessible to all. Further steps towards constituting the Forum are currently being discussed.
As to (3)
The legislation establishing the new authority should impose the
appropriate duties on the GLA without reference to specific
organisations; and these duties should enforced, primarily
through the structure of the GLA itself - see below in relation to the roles
of the Mayor and Assembly; and in the last resort by popular pressure
with the sanction of voting at election time.
We do not consider that it is necessary, or that it would be appropriate, for the legislation establishing the GLA to nominate any particular organisation or institution for compulsory involvement in any processes led by the GLA. To do so would only create a more inflexible and exclusive structure. We consider that the key criterion of being "democratic" is satisfied by the Mayor and Assembly being directly elected and by the relationship between these two parts of the GLA (as to which see below).
Before leaving this topic, we would like to comment on the suggestion of a Civic Forum put forward by LVSC. LVSC have suggested the formation of a Civic Forum which would be a representative body, with 1-200 members representing pan London voluntary and community agencies by interest, such as disability, older people, under-fives, the environment, homelessness, ethnic minorities, women, gay men, lesbians and various other commercial and other groups and bodies. It would have working parties and plenary sessions two or three times a year. It would be a statutory body with a formal advisory function including power to initiate debate.
The influence of LVSC and its member organisations through the LPP and other partnership arrangements has been positive and it is important that this should be preserved and developed. We believe that what is needed for this purpose is a right to take part in the decision-making processes led by the GLA, secured in the ways described in this Response, not the right to be "represented" in yet another body with a merely advisory role.
There is a danger that the existence of such a body would provide the GLA with an excuse for not working in the more participative ways we have advocated: it could argue that all it has to do is to listen to the advices emanating for the Forum. We believe that to give such a forum special statutory status would be a retrograde step in achieving the Green Paper's goal of "bringing decision-making closer to the people" (para 1.03). And it would certainly tend to thicken the fog at present obscuring how decisions are made, not dispel it which is vital in order to restore confidence in London government.
13. Turning now to the question of the implementation of policies developed through the sorts of inclusive processes we have called for, we refer to para 3.12 of our Discussion Paper.
Responsibility for implementation will, broadly speaking, fall on the various bodies affected by the policies in question (including the GLA itself in relation to the agencies it controls), in whatever sector of the economy and civic society. These same bodies will have been involved as participants in putting together these policies and the strategies/action plans associated with them. They will usually have committed themselves in the course of that process to playing their part in implementation. We do not, at this stage at any rate, seek extra enforcement powers for the GLA .
However the 32 boroughs and the Corporation of London should be bound to observe London-wide strategies. They should therefore be obliged by law to incorporate the strategic plans into their borough plans. Their participation, either individually or via the ALG in the processes to arrive at these strategies, should be means enough to ensure that the strategies did not interfere with borough independence other than so far as necessary to secure wider benefits.
The GLA will be directly responsible for implementation within the subject or service areas over which it has direct or indirect authority. It will do so via the agencies set up for the purpose including the London Development Agency and the London Transport Authority/Agency.
14. We strongly recommend that the GLA should have a power of general competence, that is a blanket power to do anything the law does not exclude. (para 3.16 of the Discussion Paper). This does not make the GLA any more "powerful" (in the sense that some people seem to fear it may be), merely capable of being more effective. It is equivalent to undoing the hand-cuffs which otherwise might prevent it from doing things that have the support of Londoners (established as above described). By the same token it important that the GLA is given power to raise money by taxes or otherwise.
Chapter 2 The mayor and the Assembly
We are in general agreement with the proposals in the Green Paper subject to one point, that is as to the relationship between the Mayor and the Assembly and in particular the role of the Assembly in relation to strategic planning.
In our view it is vital to distinguish clearly between the respective roles of the two parts of one authority: there must be no element of duplication of function or room for dispute or power struggle.
London needs clarity and this is especially important in relation to this new authority being inserted between the borough councils and central government. Clarity as to precisely who is responsible for what is an essential feature of making government comprehensible to ordinary people and this is essential if the new arrangements are to be effective in restoring the confidence of Londoners in the institutions of representative government.
The GLA's executive functions, consisting of its control over the various pan-London agencies and the leadership role discussed above, should be placed fairly and squarely and exclusively with the Mayor.
The Assembly's job is to approve the budget and scrutinise the Mayor's actions. It is the body through which the Mayor is accountable for every £ he or she spends and for every action he or she takes.
The Mayor's budget, in addition to including budgets for the various agencies which the GLA controls, directly or indirectly, will include details of the Mayor's proposals for the participative strategy making processes proposed for the forthcoming period (the leadership role). The Assembly will be able to insist on compliance with all the requirements which we have proposed should be written into the Mayor's decision-making processes. It will be the people's elected watchdog to insist on compliance with these duties. The Assembly will be able to scrutinise progress during the year and a full report will be made at each year end.
If inclusive/participative processes led by the Mayor produce outcomes which the mayor endorses, these outcomes are then London's plans in the sense of being owned by the numerous participants in the process of arriving at them. They are not just the Mayor's plans. Assuming that the implications for the agencies controlled by the Mayor are within the budget approved by the Assembly, it would be quite wrong for the Assembly to have power to alter or disallow the result: if it had, this would be a serious deterrent to participation in the process. The Mayor and all other participants need to be able to negotiate without fear of being overruled by the Assembly.
The Assembly should not therefore have to power to disallow or alter strategies adopted by the Mayor as a result of the participative and inclusive processes we have described, except in so far as they take expenditure controlled by the GLA outside the approved budget.
Assembly members will be able to take part in any processes the Mayor decides on. These are likely to include non-adversarial inquiries by committees set up to look at various topics or round-tables of the kind suggested above. Assembly members will be able to sit on these, to chair such bodies where appropriate.
The Assembly if it wishes can also have committees of its own on any subject and would be free to propose policy and strategy initiatives which would no doubt be highly influential; but duplication with work being carried on by committees or other processes set up by the Mayor should obviously be avoided if possible.
This may at first sight look like reducing the Assembly to a body without any real power. One is used to the concept of councillors having the last say over council decision making (though in practice their ability to disagree with officers is often very limited, except in councils which operate a strong cabinet system, which would be wholly inappropriate to an Assembly plus Mayor model). But what the Green Paper is rightly proposing is a "new model of government". Several things are new about it: the GLA is, in its leadership role, a strategic overseer and leader, not a service provider; it makes decisions by leading inclusive/participative processes; and its functions are divided between Mayor and Assembly.
We believe that these powers of scrutiny and budgetary control, plus the ability of individual members or Assembly committees to participate in decision-making processes led by the Mayor, plus the possibility that Assembly members could hold various appointments, will give the assembly ample clout, provide the necessary "checks and balances" and make the job of Assembly member attractive and valuable.
We believe that the proposal we make here eliminates the problem of conflict with the Mayor recognised in para 2.06.1 of the Green Paper. That problem arose because it is there suggested that the Assembly would need to approve the actual strategies. We believe this proposal also avoids the need for the Assembly to have staff to advise it on the question of approving strategies (which could involve a considerable duplication of work with that done by staff in the Mayor's office) and also avoids the danger, now common at borough level, of members suffering from work overload.
We do not believe that this proposal will give a Mayor too much power. The most important thing for London is that the strategies should be strong. The strength of the strategies will lie partly in their status as incorporated in the plans of the boroughs, and partly, assuming they have been brought into being through the participative processes we have called for, in their inherent authority resulting from the participation embedded in them and the commitment of the various players (including the Mayor) to play their part in implementing them.
Q1. Should the mayor be full-time or could the post be combined with other work or another elected position?
The Mayor should be full time.
To avoid distractions and conflicts of interest, during his or her term of office the
Mayor
should:
(1) Give up all company directorships and place all shareholdings in `blind
trusts' during his or her term of office;
(2) Not pursue a business or professional career or act as a paid consultant;
(3) Not hold elected office at any other level of government. (An MEP, MP or Borough Councillor could stand for Mayor, but would have to resign the other office(s)
if elected).
The severance pay at the end of a Mayor's term of office should be generous enough to
compensate for the career disruption and financial loss these rules might cause.
Q2. Should the mayor be responsible for drawing up the budgets and strategies, and the assembly for approving them?
The Mayor should be responsible for drawing up the GLA's budgets and London's strategies. The Assembly should be responsible for approving the GLA's budgets (which will include any action by the GLA or agencies controlled by it pursuant to the strategies) but should not have to approve the strategies generally. See reasoning under this Chapter heading above.
Q3. How do we provide for an inclusive consultative process involving London's stakeholders, particularly voluntary bodies, in the process of devising strategies?
Whilst warmly welcoming the intention behind this question, it will be clear that for the reasons explained above we consider the concept of "consultation" inappropriate for devising strategies which are not merely strategies of the GLA but are strategies for the GLA's partners and other stakeholders whose contributions are necessary for their implementation and who must therefore have participated in devising them and should be free to initiate proposals. Nor could any single "process" be adequate. A range of processes will be needed. The essential qualities of the processes for involving London's stakeholders, including voluntary bodies, in devising strategies are set out in para 5 above. These should be enacted as statutory duties, overseen by the Assembly, for the reasons explained above.
Q4. What arrangements should be introduced to ensure that any disagreements, particularly between mayor and assembly, are properly aired and then resolved?
We have argued that the possibility of disagreement between the Mayor and Assembly
should be minimised by a clear division of powers between them: see the introductory
paragraphs under this Chapter heading. Any disagreement over the budget will be a
matter for negotiation between the Mayor and the Assembly before a statutory deadline.
Disagreement at any other level should generally be avoided by strict separation of powers
and functions.
As to disagreements arising between the participants in the course of devising strategies,
the processes proposed by the Mayor, with the approval of the Assembly should contain
appropriate provisions for dispute resolution (see paragraph 5 above). As to airing
generally, it goes without saying that all the proceedings of the GLA should be very
openly conducted.
Q5. Should the mayor have limited powers of appointment to other pan-London organisations, working with the GLA to implement its strategies? If so, which organisations?
The mayor should have powers of appointment over all pan-London bodies.
Q6. Should there be a limit to the circumstances in which the assembly can reject a mayoral nominee for an appointment, particularly as under the Nolan principles, the mayor will have advertised all appointments? If so, what should the limitations be?
There must be limits, otherwise the Assembly could keep blocking good. The grounds should essentially be limited to unfitness for the proposed duties
(As US Senate confirmatory hearings demonstrate, this still leaves scope for argument!)
Q7. How might the assembly's scrutiny role be defined to achieve maximum effect?
As argued above, the powers of scrutiny need to be very tough. They should be powers of scrutiny over the way the Mayor proposes to do things and over past performance. This includes the Mayor's proposals as to the way he or she proposes to involve Londoners in decision-making. The Assembly will be able to insist on compliance with all the requirements which we have proposed should be written into the Mayor's decision- making processes (see answer to Q5). But these are not powers of scrutiny over the way London proposes to do things, over London's strategies. The need for the Mayor to obtain the Assembly's approval of the budget will include control over any tax raising proposed by the Mayor. It will also include control over any actions required by the GLA itself, or agencies over which it has direct or indirect control, to implement the strategy.
Q8 Should the assembly have a general power to summon or should it be clearly defined/ If it should be defined, in what ways?
The Assembly should have a general power to summon for the purposes of its functions as defined above. Its scrutiny and budgetary powers will open up a wide range of matters into which it could inquire. But it would not be appropriate for the Assembly to run enquiries or processes in competition with the mayor - the mayor and Assembly being two parts of one authority, it should operate as one.
Q9 Should assembly members be paid (unlike existing local government representatives)?
Assembly members should be paid. Such a small number will only be able to do their jobs properly if they devote considerable time. It should be a full time job or main job. Standing for the Assembly should not be restricted to the retired, people with unearned incomes, zealots prepared to live on extremely low incomes, or people who were unemployable anyway. So they should be paid a reasonable salary.
We recommend same terms and conditions as MPs. No extra pay for taking part in any GLA process, such as chairing an enquiry into a particular topic, or appointment to the board of one of the executive agencies. Nolan rules to prevent corruption and ensure that potentially conflicting interests are declared. However Assembly members should, like MPs but not the Mayor, be allowed to do other jobs as well.
Chapter 3 Electoral Issues
Q10 What system should be used for the mayoral election?
The Mayor should be elected by Alternative Vote
Q11 What combination of constituencies and voting systems creates an effective assembly?
The Assembly should take a London-wide view, and reflect (so far as possible with only about 30 members) the huge plurality of outlooks and communities of interest in London. Local geographical representation would obstruct both of these.
The processes of the Authority for devising and implementing strategy and action plans will take place outside the Assembly chamber. In these the Borough councils will be represent themselves, so will the various local authority led and private sector led partnerships. The Association of London Government will represent the borough councils generally and the other umbrella bodies such as LVSC will represent their various constituencies.
There is therefore a strong case for the Assembly members being elected by Single Transferable Vote on a single London-wide constituency, with candidates allowed but not required to join party lists.
This would allow voters (if they wished) to vote simply on party lines - ie for a `slate' of candidates put up by a particular party, in the party's chosen order of precedence. But it would also allow them to be more subtle if they wished - for example to vote for candidates from one party in their own preferred order - giving some higher priority, and missing out others, or to vote for individual candidates from a range of parties or interests.
It would be possible for parties if they chose, to specify candidates as representing particular parts of London. But it would not be required.
No party list should offer candidates for more than (say) 67% of the seats on offer, to (1) ensure that no party held more than this proportion, which would be unhealthy, (2) encourage (although not force) voters to think about their preferences more systematically.
This proposal does raise a serious issue that the expense of electioneering across the whole city would favour established parties and rich candidates. However:
The Mayor should have a fixed term of 4 years. Assembly members should also serve a 4 year fixed term. Half should be elected with the Mayor, half at the midpoint of the Mayoral term.
Both Mayor and Assembly members should stand down after 8 years to prevent corrupt `dynastic' approaches from developing. However either should be free to stand again in any election after the one in which they stood down - ie 4 years on for the Mayor or 2 years on for Assembly members - if the public really want someone back after having had the chance to see someone else in action, the rules should not prevent it.
Q14 Should mayoral candidates be limited (as in local elections) to British, Commonwealth or EU citizens resident or working in London?
Mayoral candidates should be limited to British, Commonwealth and EU citizens living or working in London. Likewise for Assembly members.
Q15 Should there be ways of limiting the number of candidates standing for mayor? What should these be?
There should be no financial deposit, but a requirement for Mayoral candidates to collect at least (say) 2000 sponsors.
A financial deposit would be undesirable since there is no correlation between ability to pay and having a worthwhile programme and appropriate skills. Instead, candidates should have to demonstrate a substantial constituency of support.
Assembly candidates should also have to provide a significant number of sponsors - say 300.
Q16 What controls should we put on campaign funding by candidates for mayor and assembly?
GLA election expenses should have controls analogous to those on Parliamentary election spending.
It is repugnant for candidates to be able to buy electoral exposure.
Chapter 4 Functions of the Authority
Land-use planning
Q17 Is strategic planning guidance or a structure plan the best model for the GLA to set out a strategic planning framework? Are there other models which should be considered?
A Structure Plan for London is indispensable.
This should be part of the Authority's Strategic Plan for London.
The Strategic Plan should not be constrained by the current limitations of the planning system.
Specifically:
(1) It should not presuppose that development is beneficial. Developers should have to show the need for development, in terms of improving the quality of life in compliance with sustainability principles, with particular reference to the disadvantaged;
(2) It should embrace all aspects of the urban metabolism, especially transport, energy supply and use, water and waste water, and economic activity, and not be artificially limited to `land use'
(3) It should set targets and limits for environmental impacts and quality of life.
(4) It should set requirements for relevant substitution for loss or damage to environmental capital.
(5) It should be produced and updated through inclusive and accessible processes (see answer to Q3)
(6) The inquiry and appeals procedures should be investigative, deliberative, consensus seeking and expeditious, instead of being adversarial and legalistic. The role of lawyers should be minimised.
Q18 Should the planning framework be restricted to general policies and principles, or are there cases where site-specific proposals might be appropriate in pursuit of strategic policies?
The Strategic Plan should not include site specific proposals with the exception of a few major sites of London-wide importance (see para 11). But it should make area specific proposals, for example for regeneration of particular areas or for new public transport links on specified corridors. And the principles outlined in the previous answer would make it influential over site based proposals from Boroughs.
Q19 Under the strategic planning guidance model, what arrangements might be used to ensure proper consultation and independent assessment?
Not applicable.
However the same question should be asked about the Strategic Plan. This should be developed through group based deliberative processes or the kind we have described.
Q20 Should the GLA have powers to direct amendments to borough plans, or should it rely on the Secretary of State's powers to do so?
Q21 Should the GLA rely on the Secretary of State's powers where it sees a need for intervention in individual development control decisions on strategic grounds? Or should the GLA have its own powers of direction; and if so, in what circumstances?
The GLA should have its own powers to direct amendments to borough plans and
intervene
in individual developments where necessary to secure the aims of the Strategic Plan for
London.
The Secretary of State should only intervene very exceptionally in London planning
matters,
and only on the grounds that a decision was inconsistent with the Government's
nationally
adopted planning policies and guidance.
Q22 Should the GLA have development control powers in relation to particular types of development? If so, what should these be, and what are the resource implications?
The GLA should not need development control powers.
Development control is essentially about making sure developments reflect plan policies. The GLA's powers to intervene in plans should therefore be sufficient.
Transport
Q23 What sort of link should there be between the GLA and the LTA and what should the mayor's role be?
The GLA should set the LTA's overall aims, targets, budgets, performance measures and areas of activity, and monitor its performance.
The Mayor's role should be same in this field as any other - see answer to questions 1 to 8. The Mayor should not chair the LTA since it should be an operational rather than policy making body.
There must be clear distinction between policy - set politically by the authority - and implementation, overseen by the LTA. This is because there is more to transport (or, better, access) policy than the integrated management of provision (welcome as that will be!)
The GLA should make reducing the need to travel its top priority. This involves integrating many policies and activities which go well beyond the scope of the LTA, including land use planning and public service provision.
Q24 Who should be appointed to the Board of the LTA?
LTA members should be appointed to represent constituencies for access in London, including employers, commuters, users of public transport, pedestrians, cyclists, environmentalists.
The Board should ensure the LTA meets its functional objectives. The Board should not include technical specialists (eg road engineers, bus service managers); they should be on the staff.
Q25 Which transport functions should be included in the LTA?
The LTA should have powers to commission and regulate all mobility-related
infrastructure
and services in London. This should include all public roads, cycle routes, pedestrian
facilities, heavy and light rail and water-borne transport services and infrastructure
within
London's boundaries. The only exception should be air.
The LTA can only integrate modes if it can influence them all. It will need to reflect
national
policies in its management of rail and road links to the rest of the country. But it would
be
unable to do its job if control of these were kept elsewhere.
Q26 What Structure should the LTA have?
Q27 What is the right mix of direct and indirect powers for the LTA?
The LTA should essentially be a commissioning, franchising and performance monitoring body.
Operation of different transport activities should by and large remain where it is.
Q28 What role should the LTA play with regard to heavy-rail services?
Q29 What role should the LTA play with regard to transport on the river
Thames?
See Q25.
The LTA should have the same regulatory, funding and investment powers over heavy rail services within London that it has over bus or tube services: they are all parts of the same system and need to be managed coherently together.
Q30 What principles should the Government apply to define the roads which should remain `national', GLA or local?
Not applicable. See Q25.
Q31 What powers should the GLA have to raise revenue from boroughs or transport users?
The GLA should have a power of general competence. This would include power to raise revenue in any ways not prohibited by law.
It should be a political decision by the GLA, taken in the light of the LTA's proposed operational plan, how to raise money for transport and all other policy priorities.
Economic Development and Regeneration
Q32 What should the GLA's strategic role be and what should the links be between
the
GLA and LDA?
The GLA should set the LDA's overall aims, targets, budgets, performance measures and areas of activity, and monitor its performance.
As with transport, economic development policy should be set politically, with implementation overseen by the LDA. It would be ruinous for the LDA to pursue a policy of its own which was not in accord with the GLA's.
The GLA's economic development policy should be based on ensuring that the basic needs and aspirations of all Londoners are met, within the environment's `carrying capacity' limits. `Growth', `competitiveness', `inward investment' and such like are only means to these ends. See generally the introductory sections of the response.
Q33 What particular London problems or opportunities should influence the structure and functions of the LDA?
We have stated that the implications of the sustainability agenda when applied to London are outside the scope of this Response: they are matters to be examined by the GLA in its leadership role. The LDA should be so structured and its functions so defined that it can respond to whatever role for it may emerge in due course.
In then meantime, on the basis implied by the question that the initial structure and functions may depend on a view of current problems and opportunities, we suggest the following
Market forces are likely to favour industries which offer profits in the short term due to rising demand, for example financial industries and tourism, but these profits may not benefit the people most in need. Moreover overdependence on financial services may be a problem due to (a) overexposure to the risks inherent in international currency and financial markets and (b) too many eggs in one basket and perhaps (c) inappropriate to the unused human capacity of Londoners. Similarly increased investment in tourism may be mistaken in view of (a) the heavy energy use of travel which conflicts with the need to use less energy (b) the risk of oil prices increasing so as to reduce the number of visitors and (c) possibly the questionable impact on local communities.
Diversity is a key principle. London risks overdependence on global financial services. It should learn the lesson of cities like Glasgow which allowed their economies to become overdependent on apparently secure industries (in Glasgow's case steam locomotive and ship building) which vanished. Indeed a case can be made that financial services are a good deal more ephemeral and less reliable than Glasgow's industries, which required immovable capital equipment and made things people wanted!
London has opportunities for an `integrated industrial ecology' based on reuse and recycling of resources. London's very high population density creates both the need and the opportunity to manage resource flows `ecologically': that is, to get the greatest possible use out of energy, water, nutrients and other natural resources by reusing, recycling, recovering, remanufacturing and repairing. There is enormous scope for a `win-win-win' programme of job creation, improvement in living standards and environmental efficiency improvements through promoting local businesses in energy efficiency, renewable energy, recycling, urban market gardening and such like.
Q34 What should the role of local stakeholders be in setting the GLA's strategic direction?
As with other issues, stakeholders should be involved in setting strategic priorities through the GLA's political processes. The LDA should work closely with partners from community enterprise as well as the conventional private sector.
Q35 What functions should the GLA have to help it enhance London's competitiveness and what should its role be in supporting the needs of business?
This is the wrong question. The GLA's function should be to lead London on its journey towards sustainability and to be responsible for making the necessary decision-making processes take place (the "leadership role"). These processes will result in strategies and action plans: it is these that will define the role the GLA can play in enhancing London's competitiveness and supporting the role of business. These details should not be written into the description of the powers of the authority as independent functions.
In so far as the question relates to the role of the LDA, the LDA's purpose is to help and ensure that business serves London, not to make London serve business!
Environmental protection
Q36 Should the GLA co-ordinate Local Agenda 21 activity across London?
Local Agenda 21 is currently taking place at borough level in an almost completely disconnected way and certainly in a completely uncoordinated way.
Given the leadership role described above, the GLA is bound to want to see that this activity is reflected in its own plan-making and that it is supported in whatever way may be appropriate. This might be financial support, it might be coordination, though coordinate may be too directive a term for a process whose validity depends on voluntary participation. It might take many other forms of support or cooperation.
Here again these are matters for the GLA once established, they are not matters suitable to be spelt out in legislation.
As to pan-London Agenda 21, see para 8 of the Introduction to this Response.
Q37 Should the GLA be responsible for developing an air quality management strategy for London? What powers might it need to ensure that the strategy is implemented?
Q38 Should the GLA be responsible for developing a noise reduction strategy for London?
The GLA should develop air management and noise reduction strategies for London. In addition to existing local authority and Environment Agency enforcement powers, the main requirement for both will be powers to reduce and exclude traffic. These extra statutory powers should be written into the legislation as necessary tools likely to be needed for achieving the basic object of the new system of government namely for London to become a more sustainable city.
Q39 What should the GLA's role be with regard to local environment quality? Should the assembly make a regular audit of London's local environment quality and suggest ways to improve it?
The Strategic Plan for London should set London wide targets for environmental standards and enhancement. All GLA and Borough plans and programmes should be appraised for consistency with these objectives, and public funding and contracts made conditional on promoting them.
Q40 Should the GLA be responsible for developing a strategic waste policy for
London?
Q41 So far as land-use planning is concerned, should this be confined to broad
principles
set out in guidance or a structure plan, or is a more detailed London-wide waste
development
plan needed?
Q42 Should the GLA also be given separate powers to develop a comprehensive
municipal waste management plan for London?
Q43 Whichever model is preferred, what powers would the GLA need to ensure the
implementation of its strategy by local authorities and others?
The GLA should be required to produce a Waste Strategy for London with targets for waste reduction and avoidance, reuse recycling of all waste streams. To implement it the GLA should have powers to
Q44 What role should the GLA have in respect of tourism in London? How should
the
GLA's role with the London Tourist Board be developed?
Q45 What role should the GLA take on in respect of English Heritage issues? How
should
its relationship with English Heritage be defined?
Q46 How might the GLA's creation affect the role and structure of the London Arts
Board?
Q47 What other strategic bodies in arts, culture and leisure could be affected by
the
creation of the GLA, and in what way?
Q48 What sort of role should the GLA play in respect of non-strategic London bodies
such
as the Centre for Young Musicians?
All these matters are relevant to London as a sustainable city and are thus within the remit of the GLA's leadership role. The GLA should therefore develop cooperative relationships with all the bodies concerned. It could well be useful for the Mayor to have powers of appointment over some of them and for suitable Assembly members to take these appointments.
Police
Q49 Should we have a police authority with a majority of elected members from the
GLA?
We should have a police authority with the majority of elected members from the LGA.
Democratic accountability of London's policing is overdue. The non-Assembly members should reflect interests concerned with police activities and crime prevention: ethnic and other minority groups (eg gays) who have had cause for concern over police behaviour in the past, civil rights, rehabilitation and crime reduction NGOs.
The London PCCG (Police& Community Consultative Group) Forum should be retained and developed.
Fire Services
Q50 What organisational structure is most suitable for the provision of Fire Services
with
the Establishment of a GLA?
We agree that the LFCDA should be reconstituted as a Board responsible to the GLA and that this should include members drawn from the boroughs.
Pan-London Bodies
Q51 Should LPAC be absorbed by the GLA?
No.
LPAC is a valuable source of expert advice working under a board of councillors. The advice hitherto given to central government (and which central government has been free to accept or reject without reference to Londoners) will in future be given primarily to the GLA. LPAC will continue to provide services to the boroughs.
"Small is beautiful"; and the independence of bodies providing expert services enhances the quality of that advice and the respect it commands. On the other side of the coin, the responsibility for such advice can be clearly identified so that those responsible can be readily called upon to justify their advice.
We consider that to absorb LPAC in the GLA would be to throw away much of the advantages it at present has.
The proposed split of functions within the GLA between Mayor and Assembly affords a further strong reason for LPAC remaining independent, because if absorbed it would naturally fall under the control of the Mayor, albeit subject to the Assembly's budgetry and scrutiny functions.
Undoubtedly LPAC will continue to play an important part, indeed as part of strategic thinking processes led by the GLA the importance of its work could increase. It needs to be held in the respect it deserves and also to be open to challenge.
The proper course is for LPAC to remain independent but for the GLA to appoint (say) half its Board. One or more of these appointees would be likely in practise to be Assembly members.
It may well be that for operational purposes close working arrangements with GLA staff will be desirable. That would be a matter for operational decision, not formal structure.
Q52 Which of these options for the future of the LRC would best serve London's needs?
As a matter of structure, we favour the first option - ie similar to LPAC. Other aspects are a matter for operational decision.
Another point needs to be considered as a matter of legal powers/ function of LRC. It should not be operated as a commercial consultancy but as a properly funded pubic servant. Its research is of great value in support of moves towards London becoming a more sustainable city: access to this resource should not be limited to the rich and powerful. Its resources should be freely accessible to everyone concerned in processes led by the GLA. The London Citizens Forum could be a channel for this purpose.
Q53 Should the opportunity be taken to bring the LEU within the GLA to support its strategic sustainability policies?
Undoubtedly the LEU will be an important source of expertise in supporting strategic policies for sustainability and will, like LPAC, work closely with the GLA. It can also continue to provide important services to the boroughs.
Once again we favour the option of remaining independent but with closely coordinated working arrangements.
Q54 Should the LBGC remain as a free standing organisation or should its strategic functions be absorbed by the GLA?
Here again we favour remaining a free-standing agent.
Qs 51-54. Our recommendations are made as a matter of initial approach based on experience of the past. We do not intend them to be cast in concrete. Undoubtedly the optimum arrangements and relationships should be the subject of open and independent review after the overall structure and functioning of the GLA has been settled.
Of course the work of all these bodies needs to be more coordinated. And it will be an important part of the role of the GLA to do this. But it is worth bearing in mind that experience of government bodies at all levels does not establish that separate departments of one organisation relate to each other better than independent organisations.
Our recommendation for these bodies to remain independent is also consistent with our description of the inclusive nature of the thinking/planning processes which London as a whole needs to engage in. It is important that all these bodies conceive themselves as being part of and serving those processes, rather than as serving a political master and as part of a top-down system.
Q55 Should the GLA take responsibility for the LPFA or should it be merged with one
or
more of the boroughs funds?
Q56 Is there a case for merging some, or all, of the borough funds with the LPFA if it
were
part of the GLA?
We have no views
Q57 Should the LAS remain outside the GLA?
We have no views
Q58 Is it preferable for the LVRPA to remain as now, as a free-standing authority?
The Lea Valley Regional Park Authority should remain as now.
Q59 What access should the GLA have to new revenues beyond those it inherits?
There should be no prior dogmatic restrictions on the GLA's powers to raise and spend money in whatever ways Londoners democratically mandate, through means such as local taxes (including ones on waste, energy, resource consumption, pollution, parking and driving), levies, charges and planning agreements.
We fully support the aims in 5.02 but do not believe they are consistent with the constraints in 5.03. We are particularly troubled by the first indent in 5.03. Provided financial decisions and their consequences are open and transparent, and that probity, prudence and value for money are externally monitored and enforced, we believe Londoners should have the right to vote for higher levels of public expenditure - and the revenue raising to support it - if they so wish.
The independent roles of the Assembly and the Mayor provide a secure system of democratic accountability and uphold the principle of "no taxation without representation".
Q60 What discretion should it have to adjust the balance of its expenditure between services and how this can be achieved?
The GLA should have complete freedom to switch money between services, subject only to a requirement for transparency and for publication of independent appraisal of the value for money achieved in delivering the authority's stated aims.
We also believe that the current financial regime for local authorities is in many ways stultifying and inefficient and would therefore wish to turn the conservative argument in 5.14 on its head. Instead of constraining the GLA within the existing (and in many ways highly unsatisfactory) financial arrangements to avoid inconsistency, we should grasp the opportunity of a fresh start to design the best new financial arrangements we can for London. Provided they work as hoped, we should then extend these to other local authorities.
Q61 How should the strategic and central activities of the mayor (eg representational work, task forces, promotion of London, salary and administrative costs) be funded, within the constraint that extra public expenditure needs to be offset by savings?
We see no justification for imposing in advance a requirement for no increase in public expenditure. These functions should be funded like the rest of the Authorities work: through some combination of savings or cuts elsewhere and increased revenue raising as mandated by Londoners through the ballot box.
THE REFERENDUM
We would add that we agree that the experiment of a directly elected mayor is worth
making. But we are aware that this is much disputed and we recommend that a separate
question on this, as well as a separate question on the authority having a power to tax,
should be included in the referendum. The questions asked would then be
(1) Are you in favour of London having a directly elected strategic authority?
(2) Are you in favour of London having a directly elected mayor?
(3) Are you in favour of the authority having taxing powers?
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